Are There Fast Tracks in Economic Departments? Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists

In this paper, we analyze the timing of promotions in academic departments. Contrary to previous attempts in the empirical literature, we test <p> alternative theories of fast tracks by adding a measure of performance in <p> our analysis. We find that learning from past performance is an important <p> factor to explain the time spent as assistant and associate professor. In <p> addition, our analysis shows the existence of a handicapping policy: individuals who had a fast promotion in the past are less likely to be promoted <p> quickly again. We also find that the handicap is relative, that it does not <p> survive the whole career and that it is possible for these individuals to <p> beat it if they achieve a given level of productivity. We interpret our find- <p> ings as evidence that incentives and sorting matter in academia and that <p> using relative handicaps can help to balance these two concerns. Finally, <p> we look at the productivity pattern of individuals with different career <p> profiles and find that fast tracks are always more productive than their <p> pairs, even after the last promotion, what suggests an effective selection <p> process.