Bank CEO Pay-Performance Relations and the Effects of Deregulation.
The authors test the deregulation hypothesis that posits that bank CEO compensation became more sensitive to performance as bank management became less regulated. They observe a significant increase in pay-performance sensitivities from their 1976-81 regulation subsample to their 1982-88 deregulation subsample. These increases in pay sensitivities after deregulation are observed for salary and bonus, stock options, and common stock holdings. The authors observe increases in the pay-performance relation associated with high-capitalization-ratio banks, consistent with providing incentives for wealth creation while even larger increases in pay-performance sensitivity for lower capitalization-ratio banks suggest an Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation moral hazard problem. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Crawford, Anthony J ; Ezzell, John R ; Miles, James A |
Published in: |
The Journal of Business. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 68.1995, 2, p. 231-56
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Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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