Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
Year of publication: |
May 2017
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Authors: | Sugaya, Takuo ; Wolitzky, Alexander |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 12.2017, 2, p. 691-729
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Subject: | Repeated games | private monitoring | Wiederholte Spiele | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE2270 [DOI] hdl:10419/197202 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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