Bureaucratic trade-policy decisions as a repeated game
Year of publication: |
1992
|
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Authors: | Moore, Michael O. |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 148.1992, 4, p. 607-627
|
Subject: | Außenwirtschaftspolitik | Foreign economic policy | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Theorie | Theory |
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