Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Bizzotto, Jacopo ; Vigier, Adrien |
Published in: |
Economic theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-0479, ZDB-ID 1398355-6. - Vol. 72.2021, 3, p. 705-721
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Subject: | Bayesian Persuasion | Dynamic Games | Information Provision | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kommunikation | Communication | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Signalling |
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