Centralized versus decentralized institutions for expert testimony
Year of publication: |
June 2017
|
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Authors: | Kim, Chulyoung |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 173.2017, 2, p. 209-238
|
Subject: | Zivilprozess | Civil litigation | Rechtsberufe | Legal profession | Experten | Experts | Rechtsordnung | Legal system | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Entscheidungstheorie | Decision theory | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law |
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