Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types.
Authors: | Forges, Françoise ; Koessler, Frédéric |
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Institutions: | Université Paris-Dauphine |
Subject: | Information privée | Théorie des jeux | Analyse bayésienne |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2005/11) v.41, p.793-811 |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
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