Comparing two ways for eliminating candidates in three-alternative elections using sequential scoring rules
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Lepelley, Dominique ; Smaoui, Hatem |
Published in: |
Group decision and negotiation. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0926-2644, ZDB-ID 1155213-X. - Vol. 28.2019, 4, p. 787-804
|
Subject: | Scoring rules | Monotonicity paradoxes | Condorcet efficiency | Nanson elimination rule | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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