Consistent flexibility : enforcement of deficit rules through political incentives
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Dotti, Valerio ; Janeba, Eckhard |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 79.2023, p. 1-28
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Subject: | Deficit bias | Fiscal rules | Flexibility | Policy design | EU-Staaten | EU countries | Finanzpolitik | Fiscal policy | Öffentliche Schulden | Public debt | Theorie | Theory | Haushaltsdefizit | Budget deficit | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Haushaltskonsolidierung | Fiscal consolidation |
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