Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Doğan, Battal ; Yenmez, M. Bumin |
Published in: |
Economic theory bulletin. - Cham : Springer Internat. Publ., ISSN 2196-1093, ZDB-ID 2733052-7. - Vol. 8.2020, 1, p. 125-137
|
Subject: | Market design | School choice | Consistency | Weak consistency | EADAM | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Schulauswahl | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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