Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mailath, George J. ; Morris, Stephen |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 1.2006, p. 311-340
|
Subject: | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Signalling |
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