Debt, Managers and Cartels
Year of publication: |
2014-06-06
|
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Authors: | Piccolo, Salvatore ; Spagnolo, Giancarlo |
Institutions: | Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) |
Subject: | Bankruptcy | capital structure | collusion | corporate governance | credit markets | disclosure rules | financial regulation | managerial incentives | product market competition |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | D21 - Firm Behavior ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices |
Source: |
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Debt as a (credible) collusive device, or: "Everybody happy but the consumer"
Spagnolo, Giancarlo, (1999)
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Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device, or: "Everybody Happy but the Consumer"
Spagnolo, Giancarlo, (1998)
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Anticompetitive Leverage : Revisiting the Strategic Use of Debt
Siciliani, Paolo, (2018)
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Piccolo, Salvatore, (2009)
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A Note on the Value of Residual Claimancy with Competing Vertical Hierarchies
Martina, Riccardo, (2011)
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Optimal Accomplice-Witnesses Regulation under Asymmetric Information
Piccolo, Salvatore, (2012)
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