Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence on Institutional Restraints on the Fiscal Commons Problem for Swiss Cantons
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Schaltegger, Christoph A. ; Feld, Lars P. |
Publisher: |
Basel : Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) |
Subject: | Fragmentation | Fiscal Policy | Referendums | Legislative Rules | Formal fiscal restraints |
Series: | CREMA Working Paper ; 2008-10 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/214404 [Handle] RePEc:cra:wpaper:2008-10 [RePEc] |
Classification: | E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization ; H61 - Budget; Budget Systems |
Source: |
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Schaltegger, Christoph A., (2008)
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Do large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions
Schaltegger, Christoph A., (2004)
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Do large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions
Feld, Lars P., (2004)
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Die Politische Ökonomik der Besteuerung
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Do large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions
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Are fiscal adjustments less successful in decentralized governments?
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