Dynamic incentives and agent discrimination in broiler production tournaments
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | Leegomonchai, Porametr ; Vukina, Tomislav |
Published in: |
Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Blackwell, ISSN 1058-6407, ZDB-ID 1123863-X. - Vol. 14.2005, 4, p. 849-877
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Subject: | Geflügelhaltung | Aviculture | Fleischwirtschaft | Meat industry | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management | Vertrag | Contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States | 1995-1997 |
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Dynamic Incentives and Agent Discrimination in Broiler Production Tournaments
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