Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
Year of publication: |
2007-04-01
|
---|---|
Authors: | Borgne, Eric Le ; Eggertsson, Gauti B. |
Institutions: | International Monetary Fund (IMF) |
Subject: | Governance | public opinion | inflation | central bank | monetary policy | political economy | political power | monetary fund | political pressure | political office | monetary target | intermediate monetary target |
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