Electoral incentives and firm behavior : evidence from U.S. power plant pollution abatement
Year of publication: |
October 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Doyle, Matthew ; Di Maria, Corrado ; Lange, Ian ; Lazarova, Emiliya A. |
Publisher: |
Munich : CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute |
Subject: | political economy | electoral incentives | term limits | environmental policy | pollution abatement | compliance costs | power plants | water pollution | regression discontinuity | USA | United States | Umweltpolitik | Environmental policy | Gewässerbelastung | Water pollution | Kraftwerk | Power plant | Theorie | Theory | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Umweltbelastung | Pollution |
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