Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance.

In this paper, the authors incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insurance into a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictions and on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populated by identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distribution of human capital across agents, may choose very different unemployment insurance levels in a politico-conomic equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Hassler, J. ; Mora, J.V.R. ; Storesletten, K. ; Zilibotti, F.
Institutions:	Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), Stockholms Universitet
Subject:	UNEMPLOYMENT \| INSURANCE \| SOCIAL CHOICE

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Series:	Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	55 pages
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; E21 - Consumption; Saving ; E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages ; J21 - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure ; J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207687