Executive compensation and agency costs in a family controlled corporate governance structure : the case of Italy
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Bhattacharyya, Nalinaksha ; Elston, Julie Ann Michelle ; Rondi, Laura |
Published in: |
International journal of corporate governance : IJCG. - Genève : Inderscience Enterprises, ISSN 1754-3037, ZDB-ID 2439503-1. - Vol. 5.2014, 3/4, p. 119-132
|
Subject: | dividends | executive compensation | Italy | family control | agency cost | Italien | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Familienunternehmen | Family business | Dividende | Dividend | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Lohn | Wages | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
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