Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
Year of publication: |
1991
|
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Authors: | Asheim, Geir B. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 3.1991, 3, p. 278-294
|
Subject: | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
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