Financial guarantors' executive compensation, charter value and risk-taking
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Lai, Van Son ; Soumaré, Issouf ; Sun, Yan |
Published in: |
Research in international business and finance. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0275-5319, ZDB-ID 424514-3. - Vol. 26.2012, 3, p. 387-397
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Subject: | Charter value | Financial guarantee | Managerial compensation | Optimal risk | Principal-agent problem | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Risiko | Risk |
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