Firm Mobility and Location Equilibrium.
Two types of location equilibria are compared. The first one is that of a simultaneous price and location game, the second is that of a two-stage location-then-price game. It is suggested that equilibrium locations are further apart under the second and profits are higher, since firms internalize the harmful price competition effect of moving close to each other. The paper introduces a nonpurchase option into the logit model of spatial competition and the sensitivity of the equilibrium is analyzed.
Year of publication: |
1992
|
---|---|
Authors: | Anderson, Simon P. ; Palma, Andre De ; Hong, Gap-Seon |
Published in: |
Canadian Journal of Economics. - Canadian Economics Association - CEA. - Vol. 25.1992, 1, p. 76-88
|
Publisher: |
Canadian Economics Association - CEA |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Firm mobility and location equilibrium
Anderson, Simon P., (1992)
-
Demand for Differentiated Products
Anderson, Simon P., (1987)
-
The Logit as a Model of Product Differentiation: Further Results and Extensions
Anderson, Simon P., (1989)
- More ...