Gun For Hire : Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods?
Year of publication: |
May 2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Andreoni, James |
Other Persons: | Gee, Laura K. (contributor) |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Strafe | Punishment | Verdrängungseffekt | Crowding out | Fundraising | Theorie | Theory | Experiment | Soziale Gruppe | Social group | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Altruismus | Altruism |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
---|---|
Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w17033 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w17033 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Gun for Hire : Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd Out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods?
Andreoni, James, (2011)
-
The signaling power of sanctions in social dilemmas
Weele, Joël J. van der, (2012)
-
Peer punishment of acts of omission versus acts of commission in give and take social dilemmas
Ramalingam, Abhijit, (2019)
- More ...
-
Andreoni, James, (2011)
-
Andreoni, James, (2011)
-
Gun For Hire: Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods?
Andreoni, James, (2011)
- More ...