Hidden action and outcome contractibility : an experimental test of moral hazard theory
Year of publication: |
2018
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Authors: | Hoppe, Eva I. ; Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 109.2018, p. 544-564
|
Subject: | Contract theory | Hidden action | Incentive theory | Laboratory experiments | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Experiment | Vertragstheorie | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives |
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