How Much Do Cartel Overcharges
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Boyer, Marcel |
Other Persons: | Kotchoni, Rachidi (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Kartell | Cartel | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Kartellrecht | Antitrust law |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (48 p) |
---|---|
Series: | CIRANO - Scientific Publication ; No. 2011s-35 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 10, 2011 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.1919000 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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