Human agency and behavioral economics : nudging fast and slow

Acknowledgments -- Contents -- Chapter 1 Introduction: Agency and Control -- Abstract -- Education and Architecture -- Two Systems -- A Challenge to the Very Possibility of Agency? -- The Goal and the Plan -- References -- Chapter 2 People Like Nudges (Mostly) -- Abstract -- A Principled Public? -- Popular Nudges -- Unpopular Nudges -- Why Are Some Nudges Unpopular? -- Two Dominant Principles -- No Losses by Default! -- Political Disclosures -- Manipulation -- Politics and Partisanship -- Nudges vs. Mandates -- Europe -- Central Findings -- Differences-and (the Bigger Story) Continuities -- Beyond the USA and Europe -- References -- Chapter 3 People Prefer Educative Nudges (Kind Of ) -- Abstract -- Smoking, Savings, Pollution, and Water Conservation -- Respondents in the Neutral Condition (Condition 1) -- Respondents Informed that the System 1 Nudge Is "Significantly More Effective" (Condition 2) -- Respondents Informed that the System 1 Nudge Is "Significantly More Effective," with Additional Quantitative Information (Condition 3) -- Respondents Informed that the System 2 Nudge Is "Significantly More Effective" (Condition 4) -- Respondent Preferences by Partisan Affiliation -- Voting, Children, and Abortion -- Testing the Preference as Between the System 1 or System 2 Nudge in the Context of the Three Distinctive Issues -- General Results for the Preference as Between the System 1 or System 2 Nudge in the Context of Three Distinctive Issues -- Respondent Preferences by Partisan Affiliation -- Digging Deeper -- Testing the Preference with a Within-Subjects Design -- Testing Beliefs About Effectiveness -- Comparing the Assumptions that the System 1 Nudge Is "Significantly More Effective" or "Dramatically More Effective" -- Testing the Preference with an "Either or Both" Option -- Popular Opinion, Law, and Public Policy -- References