Incentives for Experimenting Agents
Year of publication: |
2009-09
|
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Authors: | Horner, Johannes ; Samuelson, Larry |
Institutions: | Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University |
Subject: | Experimentation | Learning | Agency | Dynamic agency | Venture capital | Repeated principal-agent problem |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Published in RAND Journal of Economics, (Winter 2013), 44(4): 632-663 The price is None Number 1726RR 141 pages |
Classification: | D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior |
Source: |
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