Inefficient intra-firm incentives can stabilize cartels in cournot oligopolies
Year of publication: |
2004 ; [Elektronische Ressource]
|
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Other Persons: | Kirstein, Roland (contributor) ; Kirstein, Annette (contributor) |
Institutions: | Center for the Study of Law and Economics <Saarbrücken> (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Saarbrücken : CSLE |
Subject: | Akkordlohn | Piece rate | Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes | Collective bargaining theory | Kartell | Cartel | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Duopol | Duopoly |
Extent: | Online-Ressource, 19 p., text ill |
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Series: | Discussion paper / Center for the Study of Law and Economics. - Saarbrücken : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2093203-0. - Vol. 2004-09 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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