Information Avoidance in School Choice
I explain puzzles in the school assignment literature using a many-to-one matching model in which participants on one side of the market, the students, are endowed with ego-utilities à la Köszegi (2006). Ego concerns generate a form of information avoidance that results in non-truthful participation in DA matching mechanisms. In particular, students’ best replies may be non-monotonic in school ranks. Furthermore, students may be sensitive to signal garbling, in the sense of Blackwell (1953), even when keeping admission probabilities constant. In terms of policy, the results imply that admissions committees’ reliance on application dimensions that are seemingly weak proxies of academic performance may be beneficial. Other implications relate to the effectiveness of affirmative action policies that directly lower admission requirements: whenever students’ best replies exhibit non-monotonicity in schools’ selectivity, such policies might backfire
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Moscariello, Paola |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Schulauswahl | School choice | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Schule | School | Bildungsverhalten | Educational behaviour | Schulpolitik | School policy |
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