International commodity taxation in the presence of unemployment
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of commodity tax competition on welfare and employment under the destination and origin principles, when the labor market is imperfectly competitive owing to a binding fixed wage. Our main finding is that commodity taxation causes an employment externality whose signs may be opposite under the two principles. While tax competition leads to inefficient tax rates under both principles, we also prove that the origin principle guarantees lower unemployment and higher welfare when the fixed wage is high. Finally, we show that the employment externality still exists in a standard union model of wage determination.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Moriconi, Simone ; Sato, Yasuhiro |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727. - Vol. 93.2009, 7-8, p. 939-949
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Commodity taxation Destination principle Origin principle Unemployment Employment externality |
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