International Outsourcing and Welfare Reduction : An Entry-Deterrence Story

We show that international outsourcing may reduce welfare of the outsourcing country by deterring market-entry, thus showing a new effect which is different from the employment and the quality effects creating negative impacts of outsourcing. Entry deterrence under outsourcing reduces domestic welfare if both the profit extraction and cost saving from outsourcing are sufficiently small

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Mukherjee, Arijit
Other Persons:	Tsai, Yingyi (contributor)
Publisher:	[2009]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Outsourcing \| Theorie \| Theory \| Markteintritt \| Market entry \| Wohlfahrtsanalyse \| Welfare analysis

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (20 p)
Series:	Nottingham University, GEP Research Paper 2008/45
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 1, 2008 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1446676 [DOI]
Classification:	F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies ; F21 - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements ; F23 - Multinational Firms; International Business ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157243