Leniency Policies and Cartel Success : An Experiment
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
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Authors: | Kim, Jeong Yeol ; Noussair, Charles |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Kartell | Cartel | Straffreiheit | Exemption from punishment | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Kartellrecht | Antitrust law |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (31 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 30, 2021 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3877715 [DOI] |
Classification: | K21 - Antitrust Law ; K41 - Litigation Process ; L4 - Antitrust Policy |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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