Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions : the GSM spectrum auction in Germany

Veronika Grimm; Frank Riedel; Elmar Wolfstetter

The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction.The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions.In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Grimm, Veronika ; Riedel, Frank ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
Publisher:	München : CESifo
Subject:	Multi-unit auctions \| spectrum auctions \| telecommunications \| industrial organization \| game theory \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Mobilkommunikation \| Mobile communications \| Konzession \| Concession \| Deutschland \| Germany \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Funktechnik \| Radio engineering \| Ausschreibung \| Competitive tendering \| Auktion \| Auction

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (19 S.)
Series:	CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. 506
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: PDF Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/75734 [Handle]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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