Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms

We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Chen, Peter
Other Persons:	Egesdal, Michael (contributor) ; Pycia, Marek (contributor) ; Yenmez, M. Bumin (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Manipulation \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 2015 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2526596 [DOI]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013031803