Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Wolitzky, Alexander |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 11.2016, 3, p. 971-1004
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Mechanism design | maxmin | ambiguity aversion | bilateral trade | Myerson-Satterthwaite |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE2089 [DOI] 893313513 [GVK] hdl:10419/150299 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:2089 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Mechanism design with maxmin agents : theory and an application to bilateral trade
Wolitzky, Alexander, (2016)
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