Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Carbajal, Juan Carlos ; Ely, Jeffrey C. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 148.2013, 1, p. 104-133
|
Subject: | Allokation | Allocation | Einnahmen | Revenue | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Nutzentheorie | Utility theory | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Theorie | Theory |
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