Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chowdhury, Subhasish M. ; Sheremeta, Roman M. |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 112.2011, 2, p. 216-219
|
Subject: | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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