Old and Young Politicians
We evaluate the effect of a politician's age on political governance, reelection rates,and policies using data on Italian local governments. Our results suggest that younger politicians are more likely to behave strategically in response to election incentives: they increase spending and obtain more transfers from higher levels of government in preelection years. We argue that is a sign of stronger career concerns incentives. The results are robust to adopting three different identification strategies: fixed-effects regression, standard regression discontinuity design, and an augmented regression discontinuity design that controls for residual heterogeneity
Year of publication: |
2015
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Authors: | Alesina, Alberto F. |
Other Persons: | Troiano, Ugo (contributor) ; Cassidy, Traviss (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Politiker | Politicians | Italien | Italy | Altersgruppe | Age group | Kommunalpolitik | Local policy |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (52 p) |
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Series: | NBER Working Paper ; No. w20977 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 2015 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027266