On the Observational Equivalence of Unilateral Delegation Contracts in Duopoly

In a Cournot duopoly, if only one firm hires a manager while the other remains entrepreneurial, the Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium emerges, with the managerial firm as the leader. This happens under at least three different delegation schemes. We illustrate the different meachanisms driving this outcome through the analysis of the map of best replies at the market stage

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Delbono, Flavio
Other Persons:	Lambertini, Luca (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Vertrag \| Contract \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (12 p)
Series:	Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 1033
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 6, 2015 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2670000 [DOI]
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014272