On the optimality of resetting executive stock options
Year of publication: |
2000
|
---|---|
Authors: | Acharya, Viral V. ; John, Kose ; Sundaram, Rangarajan K. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 57.2000, 1, p. 65-101
|
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Lohn | Wages | Aktienoption | Stock option | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory |
-
How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf, (2009)
-
Why do firms use equity-based pay? Managerial compensation and stock price informativeness
Bennett, Benjamim, (2019)
-
Managerial compensation, product market competition and fraud
Andergassen, Rainer, (2016)
- More ...
-
Cross-country variations in capital structures: The role of bankruptcy codes
Acharya, Viral V., (2011)
-
On the optimality of resetting executive stock options
Acharya, Viral V., (2000)
-
Contract Renegotiation and the Optimality of resetting Executive Stock Options
Acharya, Viral V., (1998)
- More ...