Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives
Using unique panel data on production lines in U.S. minimills, we analyze the adoption of problem-solving teams and group incentive pay and their effects on productivity. Almost every line ultimately adopts group incentives. However, problem-solving teams are found almost exclusively in lines with more complex production processes. Consistent with these patterns, fixed-effects models reveal increased productivity under group incentives in all lines, while teams raise productivity in lines with more complex production processes. This evidence indicates that teams give workers a valuable opportunity to solve problems in more complex production processes, while standard operating procedures appear to suffice elsewhere.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Boning, Brent ; Ichniowski, Casey ; Shaw, Kathryn |
Published in: |
Journal of Labor Economics. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 25.2007, p. 613-650
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Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
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