Optimal CEO Incentives and Industry Dynamics
This paper develops a competitive equilibrium model of CEO compensation and industry dynamics. CEOs make product pricing and product improvement decisions subject to shareholders' compensation choices and idiosyncratic shocks to product quality. The choice of high-powered incentives optimally trades-off the benefits from expected product improvements and the associated agency costs. In market equilibrium, the interaction between CEO pay and product market decisions affects the stationary distribution of firms. We characterize a dynamic feedback effect of industry structure on CEO incentives. As a result of this effect, we predict an inverse relation between the magnitude of the performance-based component of CEO pay and, (i) across industries, the degree of heterogeneity of industry structure; (ii) within industries, firm position with respect to its peers. We empirically estimate pay-performance sensitivity for a large sample of U.S. CEOs and other top executives over the 1993 to 2004 period and find strong support for our theory. Our results offer a novel product market rationale for the increased reliance of CEO pay on bonuses and stock options over the 1990s.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Kadyrzhanova, Dalida ; Falato, Antonio |
Institutions: | Society for Economic Dynamics - SED |
Saved in:
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