Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts
Year of publication: |
2018
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Authors: | Asseyer, Andreas |
Published in: |
International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187, ZDB-ID 875355-6. - Vol. 59.2018, p. 222-252
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Subject: | Dynamic contracts | Innovation partnership | Monitoring | Procurement | Beschaffung | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Innovation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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