Ordre public <i>versus</i> ordre privé. Une approche critique de la conception williamsonienne des relations de travail aux États-Unis

Law plays a crucial role in Williamson?s transaction cost economics but this aspect has been often undermined in the academic debates. This research article proposes to remedy to this lack in literature by making a critical review of the Williamson?s law and economics theory from the analysis of the collective labor relationships in the United States. From a positive point of view, Williamson explains that law determines the rules of play (public ordering), and then individuals freely negotiate the rules that constitute the institutions of governance (private ordering). From a normative perspective, Williamson argues that this partition is efficient with respect to the economic logic of individuals. However, we show that, actually, the American law of labour relationships is based on legal pluralism and that the model of private ordering, which has been less and less used since the 1980s, has strong limitations. In this context, the analysis of the public ordering/private ordering framework that Williamson proposes is of little interest. Classification JEL : J50, J80, L20, K00<np pagenum="1038"/>