Persuasion via weak institutions
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Lipnowski, Elliot ; Ravid, Doron ; Shishkin, Denis |
Published in: |
Journal of political economy. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, ISSN 1537-534X, ZDB-ID 2010434-0. - Vol. 130.2022, 10, p. 2705-2730
|
Subject: | Politische Kommunikation | Political communication | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Informationswert | Information value | Zentralbank | Central bank | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Institutionenökonomik | Institutional economics | Theorie | Theory |
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