Political Pressure Deflection
Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes --- political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to `sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Anderson, James E. ; Zanardi, Maurizio |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Verantwortung | Responsibility | Außenwirtschaftspolitik | Foreign economic policy | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Betriebliche Altersversorgung | Occupational pension plan |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (48 p) |
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Series: | NBER Working Paper ; No. w10439 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2004 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014072173