Price Wars in an X-Market Game

In this paper, game theory is applied to the case of price wars in a market scenario game towards a converging solution of Nash equilibrium. This is done using the famous Bertrand Game, starting first with a simple version of a game involving two players with undifferentiated products who move simultaneously by merely choosing their prices, and then proceed by extending the market scenario to a Differentiated Bertrand Game. The market scenario is based on two main rivals. “LOCAL” player is faced by a lower-priced “ASIAN” player who has a significantly lower quality product. Price wars dictate market outcomes. Implications of the game reveal interesting, but rather unexpected, results. Specifically, it is shown that resorting to a price war alone is not the optimum choice by the LOCAL player. Rather, the incumbent must not lower his price, even if faced by a lower priced competitor. This runs in contrast to traditional price war theory. The introduction of lower priced substitutes do not reveal price reduction of the incumbent firm. A unique Nash equilibrium arises when the LOCAL player differentiates his products and charges higher prices compared to the ASIAN player. Consequently, price competition and price wars, when augmented by differentiated aspects of product quality, do not lead to price convergence nor necessarily lead to price reductions over time