Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Malcomson, James M. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 92.2015, p. 122-137
|
Subject: | Relational incentive contracts | Shocks | Principal types | Agent types | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Schock | Shock | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
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