Relationships among corporate governance mechanisms : evidence based on executive compensation clawback provisions
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chen, Yu ; Vann, Carol E. |
Published in: |
International journal of corporate governance : IJCG. - Genève : Inderscience Enterprises, ISSN 1754-3037, ZDB-ID 2439503-1. - Vol. 5.2014, 3/4, p. 223-244
|
Subject: | corporate governance | clawback provision | agency theory | stewardship theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
-
How to control the controller : CEO compensation and motivation
Braendle, Udo C., (2013)
-
The interactive effect of monitoring and incentive alignment on agency costs
Martin, Geoffrey, (2019)
-
CEO risk incentives and the riskiness of securitisation transactions in the financial industry
Fabrizi, Michele, (2015)
- More ...
-
Clawback provision adoption, corporate governance, and investment decisions
Chen, Yu, (2017)
-
Implications of Clawback Adoption in Executive Compensation Contracts : A Survey of Recent Research
Prescott, Gregory L., (2018)
-
The effects of national culture on financial statement comparability : a survey of research findings
Prescott, Gregory L., (2015)
- More ...