Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a global emission game when players are impatient
Year of publication: |
1998
|
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Authors: | Finus, Michael |
Other Persons: | Rundshagen, Bianca (contributor) |
Published in: |
Environmental & resource economics : the official journal of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0924-6460, ZDB-ID 1121258-5. - Vol. 12.1998, 3, p. 275-306
|
Subject: | Klimawandel | Climate change | Internationale Umweltpolitik | International environmental policy | Umweltökonomik | Environmental economics | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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