The prosecution of international crimes by specialised non-domestic courts and tribunals raises several concerns, not least in evidentiary assessments; thus, the future of international criminal justice shall be relocated to domestic trials by reliance on universal jurisdiction (“UJ”). While a few “Western” jurisdictions have recently started to employ this legal device, “Eastern” jurisdictions have consistently voiced suspicion at this trend, while other Western jurisdictions seem not yet ready to embrace it, either. Among those jurisdictions which declare themselves unwilling or unready to face this relatively new challenge, the PRC and Italy stand out, owing to their regional appeal, their involvement in (alternative?) discourses on global justice, and their millenary intertwined roots as legal civilisations. Hence, the present study investigates these two jurisdictions comparatively, as far as their stances regarding UJ’s applicability over international crimes (and practice thereto) are concerned. As for China, the overarching reason why it refrains from exercising UJ over international crimes rests with geopolitical self-restraint, expressed through the respect for third jurisdictions’ sovereignty (and, where applicable, related officials’ immunities), the principle of non-interference, as well as the principle of state consent in IR. To exemplify, China objected to the inclusion of war crimes in NIACs within the scope of mentioned Statute’s rules, arguing that UJ should be grounded in codification rather than progressive development of international customs. Mirroring its stance vis-à-vis the ICC, China is wary of deferring to UJ even at the domestic level. China’s reluctance to exercise UJ can also be inspected on a crime-by-crime basis; for instance, with regards to genocide, political arguments from the Chinese standpoint can be posited both against to and in favour of a deeper engagement with UJ. Contrary to China, Italy’s lack of UJ practice can be explained through the lenses of its overenthusiastic support for the ICC as the most appropriate forum for prosecuting international crimes. In fact, the exercise of UJ by Italian domestic courts is hindered by a series of obstacles, and Italian legislation does not yet satisfactorily cater for international crimes. Although the immediate reasons why China and Italy resist UJ in theory and practice differ, these two countries’ approaches to international justice in fact converge at a deeper foundational level around core historical conservative preferences
